By Adnan Amir
In 1948, as Pakistan struggled to establish its intelligence network, an unusual figure played a key role in shaping what would become the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Major General Walter Cawthron, an Australian-born former director of Military Intelligence in the British Indian Army, was tasked with laying the foundations of Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency. Ironically, he would later return to the country as Australia’s High Commissioner, observing firsthand the agency he had helped create.
Pakistan’s ISI remains one of the most debated intelligence agencies in the world, often perceived as a shadowy force influencing domestic politics and regional conflicts. In Pakistan’s ISI: A Concise History of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, Julian Richards attempts to unravel the agency’s history and operations, placing its evolution within the broader context of Pakistan’s political and military developments.
While the book serves as an introductory guide, it does not match the depth of works like Faith, Unity, Discipline: The ISI of Pakistan by Hein G. Kiessling or Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate by Owen L. Sirrs, which offer more comprehensive and well-researched insights into Pakistan’s intelligence apparatus.
Julian Richards is a seasoned academic specialising in intelligence and security studies. He is the director of the Center for Security and Intelligence Studies (BUCSIS) at the University of Buckingham. His academic credentials include a PhD from the University of Cambridge, focusing on political violence in Pakistan.
Richards begins with the foundation of the ISI, originally named the Directorate of Forces Intelligence, in 1948. He attributes its establishment to Major General Walter Cawthron, a British military intelligence officer who served as Pakistan Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff. The book notes that intelligence operations in Pakistan faced significant challenges from the start, including conflicts over intelligence division during partition. An unnamed director of India’s Intelligence Bureau (IB) reportedly migrated to Pakistan, bringing crucial intelligence files and equipment, highlighting the complex intelligence dynamics between the two newly formed states.
The book briefly discusses the ISI’s early years but does not offer clarity on who led the agency during the 1950s, a reflection of Pakistan’s lack of publicly available intelligence archives. Richards claims how ISI’s early leaders, such as Brigadier Syed Shahid Hamid, exaggerated Communist threats to secure funding from the United States during the Cold War. A U.S. embassy cable from the time even described Hamid as “dreaming up phantoms” to secure funding for Pakistan’s intelligence operations from U.S.
Moving through the decades, the book discusses ISI’s role in major geopolitical events, such as the Soviet-Afghan War, and post-9/11 counterterrorism operations. On Osama Bin Laden, Richards argues that ISI leadership was unaware of his presence in Abbottabad, while some lower-ranking officers may have misled the top leadership, while pursuing their own agenda.
The book provides a general overview of ISI’s origins, key events, and structural dynamics, offering a digestible account for those unfamiliar with the subject. However, the book does not delve deeply into operational details or insider perspectives. While this approach is useful for readers unfamiliar with Pakistan’s past, it might feel repetitive or simplistic for those well-versed in the subject.
Furthermore, Richards relies primarily on web-based sources and lacks first-hand accounts or archival research, limiting the depth of the analysis. This lack of depth is further reflected in the ambiguity surrounding ISI’s leadership during the 1950s, where the book fails to establish clarity, a gap that could have been addressed through deeper research into historical records.
The book also highlights regional dynamics, noting that most ISI chiefs have historically been from northern Punjab, reflecting broader patterns of dominance in Pakistan’s military establishment. One unique detail mentioned is that Asad Durrani remains the only DG ISI to have simultaneously led both ISI and Military Intelligence (MI) for a period.
Another notable aspect is the book’s unbiased tone, avoiding overt conspiracy theories or ideological leanings. Richards does not engage in sensationalism, which is often the case in discussions about ISI. Instead, he provides a broad overview of the agency’s role and impact without presenting a highly polarised viewpoint.
Despite its accessibility, this book has several shortcomings. It devotes an excessive amount of space to Pakistan’s general history. While providing historical context is important, the frequent digressions into Pakistan’s broader political developments may seem repetitive for readers who are already familiar with the country’s past. This makes it less useful for those seeking a focused study on the intelligence agency itself.
Moreover, the book contains multiple factual errors. One notable mistake appears on page 59, where it claims that Lt. Gen. Ghulam Jillani was replaced by Lt. Gen. Akhtar Abdul Rehman as ISI’s Director General in 1983. In reality, Akhtar Abdul Rehman assumed the role in 1979, while Jillani left ISI in 1977. Another error is found on page 66, where the book incorrectly identifies Tableeghi Jamaat as a Salafi movement, whereas it is actually aligned with the Deobandi school of thought. Furthermore, the book erroneously states that Javed Ashraf Qazi, a former DG ISI, served as a senator from the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), whereas he was associated with the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q). These inaccuracies suggest a lack of editorial rigor and factchecking of the book’s manuscript.
Richards’ book also highlights the structural challenges within Pakistan’s intelligence establishment, such as the lack of publicly available archives and transparency. This absence of accessible records not only limits academic research but also contributes to speculation and misinformation about the agency’s role. The book indirectly underscores the need for better documentation and historical accountability in intelligence institutions.
For general readers who are interested in Pakistan’s security policies but do not have the time or inclination to engage with more detailed research, this book offers a straightforward account that is easy to follow. Journalists and analysts who need a quick historical reference on ISI’s evolution may also find it useful, though they will need to consult more authoritative sources for detailed insights.
In conclusion, while Richards’ book is a quick read, it does not offer the kind of deep, investigative history that the subject demands. It serves as a stepping stone rather than a definitive account of Pakistan’s intelligence operations. For readers seeking a more rigorous analysis, it remains essential to turn to works that rely on primary research and firsthand accounts rather than secondary sources.
Despite its flaws, Pakistan’s ISI: A Concise History of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate plays a role in introducing readers to the subject, particularly those unfamiliar with Pakistan’s security apparatus. However, it misses an opportunity to provide fresh insights or challenge existing narratives. As intelligence agencies continue to shape geopolitics, books that critically analyse their operations with a solid research foundation will remain invaluable. While Richards’ work may be an accessible starting point, it is far from the final word on the ISI.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Coverpage’s editorial stance.
